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Abstract
The paper develops a tractable econometric model of optimal migration, focusing on expected income
as the main economic influence on migration.  The model improves on previous work in two respects: it
covers optimal sequences of location decisions (rather than a single once-for-all choice), and it allows for
many alternative location choices.  The model is estimated using panel data from the NLSY on white
males with a high school education.  Our main conclusion is that interstate migration decisions are
influenced to a substantial extent by income prospects.  On the other hand we find no evidence of a
response to geographic differences in wage distributions.  Instead, the results suggest that the link
between income and migration decisions is driven by a tendency to move in search of a better locational
match when the income realization in the current location is unfavorable.2See Greenwood [1997] and Lucas [1997] for surveys.
3 Holt (1996) estimated a dynamic discrete choice model of migration, but his framework modeled the
move/stay decision and not the location-specific flows.  Similarly, Tunali (2000) gives a detailed econometric
analysis of the move/stay decision using microdata for Turkey, but his model does not distinguish between
alternative destinations.
4Blanchard and Katz (1992, p.2), using average hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing, by
state, from the BLS establishment survey, describe a pattern of “strong but quite gradual convergence of state
relative wages over the last 40 years.”  For example, using a univariate AR(4) model with annual data, they find that
the half-life of a unit shock to the relative wage is more than 10 years.  Similar findings were reported by Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1991) and by Topel (1986).  

1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature on migration.
2  Most of this work describes patterns in the data: for
example, younger and more educated people are more likely to move; repeat and especially return
migration accounts for a large part of the observed migration flows.  Although informal theories
explaining these patterns are plentiful, fully specified behavioral models of migration decisions are
relatively scarce, and these models generally consider each migration event in isolation, without
attempting to explain why most migration decisions are subsequently reversed through onward or return
migration.
This paper develops a model of optimal sequences of migration decisions, focusing on expected
income as the main economic influence on migration.  We emphasize that migration decisions are
reversible, and that many alternative locations must be considered.  The model is estimated using panel
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth on white males with a high school education. 
Structural dynamic models of migration over many locations have not been estimated before,
presumably because the required computations have not been feasible.
3  A structural representation of the
decision process is of interest for the usual reasons: we are ultimately interested in quantifying responses
to income shocks or policy interventions not seen in the data, such as local labor demand shocks, or
changes in welfare benefits.  Our basic empirical question is the extent to which people move for the
purpose of improving their income prospects.  Work by Keane and Wolpin (1997) and by Neal (1999)
indicates that individuals make surprisingly sophisticated calculations regarding schooling and
occupational choices.  Given the magnitude of geographical wage differentials, and given the findings of
Topel (1986) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) regarding the responsiveness of migration flows to local
labor market conditions, one might expect to find that income differentials play an important role in
migration decisions.
45See for example Kennan and Walker (2001) and Woo (2002).

We model individual decisions to migrate as a job search problem.  A worker can draw a wage only
by visiting a location, thereby incurring a moving cost.  Locations are distinguished by known differences
in wage distributions, amenity values and alternative income sources.  A worker starts the life-cycle in
some home location and must determine the optimal sequence of moves before settling down. 
The decision problem is too complicated to be solved analytically, so we use a discrete approximation
that can be solved numerically, following Rust (1994).  The model is sparsely parameterized.  In addition
to expected income, migration decisions are influenced by moving costs, including a fixed cost, a reduced
cost of moving to a previous location, and a cost that is proportional to distance, and by differences in
location size, measured by the population in origin and destination locations.  We also allow for a bias in
favor of the home location.
Our main substantive conclusion is that interstate migration decisions are indeed influenced to a
substantial extent by income prospects.  On the other hand we find no evidence of a response to
geographic differences in wage distributions.  Instead, the results suggest that the link between income
and migration decisions is driven by a tendency to move in search of a better locational match when the
income realization in the current location is unfavorable.
More generally, the paper demonstrates that a fully specified econometric model of optimal dynamic
migration decisions is feasible, and that it is capable of matching the main features of the data, including
repeat and return migration.  Although this paper focuses on the relationship between income prospects
and migration decisions at the start of the life cycle, suitably modified versions of the model can
potentially be applied to a range of issues, such as the migration effects of interstate differences in welfare
benefits, the effects of joint career concerns on household migration decisions, and the effects on
retirement migration of interstate differences in tax laws.
5
2 Migration Dynamics
The need for a dynamic analysis of migration is illustrated in Table 1, which summarizes interstate
migration histories of young people in the NLSY.  Two features of the data are noteworthy.  First, a large
fraction of the flow of migrants involves people who have already moved at least once.  Second, a large
fraction of these repeat moves involves people returning to their original location.  Simple models of
isolated move-stay decisions cannot address these features of the data.  In particular, a model of return
migration is incomplete unless it includes the decision to leave the initial location as well as the decision
to return.  Moreover, unless the model allows for many alternative locations, it cannot give a complete
analysis of return migration.  For example, a repeat move in a two-location model is necessarily a return
move, and this misses the point that people frequently decide to return to a location that they had
previously decided to leave, even though many alternative locations are available.









No. of people  1768 3534 1517 1435
Movers 423 771 376 469
Movers (%) 23.9% 21.8% 24.8% 32.7%
Moves Per Mover 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6
Repeat moves 
(% of all moves)
50.6 45.9 41.3 35.7
Return Migration
( % of all moves)
Return - Home 24.0 24.1 17.5 13.4
Return - Else  12.4 7.2 5.9 3.3
Movers who return home (%) 48.7 44.5 29.8 20.9
Return-Home: % of Repeat 47.5 52.5 42.4 37.5
3 An Optimal Search Model of Migration
We model migration as an optimal search process.  The basic assumption is that wages are local
prices of individual skill bundles.  The individual knows the wage in the current location, but in order to
determine the wage in another location, it is necessary to move there, at some cost.
The model aims to describe the migration decisions of young workers in a stationary environment. 
The wage offer in each location may be interpreted as the best offer available in that location.  Although
there may be transient fluctuations in wages, the only chance of getting a permanent wage gain is to move
to a new location.  One interpretation is that wage differentials across locations equalize amenity
differences, but a stationary equilibrium with heterogeneous worker preferences and skills still requires
migration to redistribute workers from where they happen to be born to their equilibrium location. 
Alternatively, it may be that wage differentials are slow to adjust to location-specific shocks, because
gradual adjustment is less costly for workers and employers.  In that case, our model can be viewed as an
approximation in which workers take current wage levels as a rough estimate of the wages they will face6Note that this neatly sidesteps the question of whether moving costs should be specified as “psychic” costs that
directly reduce utility, or as monetary costs that reduce disposable income.  With constant marginal utility of income,
there is no meaningful difference between these two specifications.
7Even if the marginal utility of consumption is not constant, one can still compute the increase in current-period
consumption needed to just offset the utility cost of moving, and use this to translate the utility cost into an income
equivalent.  Then the optimal migration problem can be viewed as maximization of net lifetime income, and this will
be a good approximation if the compensating variation in consumption is roughly constant.  But this argument rests
on the assumption that the individual can borrow against future income (including income generated by a move) in
order to sustain current consumption.

for the foreseeable future.  In any case, the model is intended to describe the partial equilibrium response
of labor supply to wage differences across locations; from the worker’s point of view the source of these
differences is immaterial, provided that the differences are permanent.  A complete equilibrium analysis
would of course be much more difficult, but our model can be viewed as a building-block toward such an
analysis.
Suppose there are J locations, and individual i’s income yij in location j is a random variable with a
known distribution.  Migration decisions are made so as to maximize the expected discounted value of
lifetime utility, subject to budget constraints.  Consider a person with “home” location h, who is in
location  this period and in location j next period.  The flow of utility in the current period for such a
person is specified as
The notation is as follows.  C is consumption in the current period and   0 is a constant relative risk
aversion coefficient. There is a premium  that allows each individual to have a preference for their native
location (A is used as an indicator meaning that A is true).  The cost of moving from  to j is denoted by
(,j;h).
In general, the level of assets is an important state variable for this problem, but we focus on a special
case in which assets do not affect migration decisions.  Suppose the marginal utility of income is constant
( = 0 in the specification above), and suppose that individuals can borrow and lend without restriction at
a given interest rate.  Then expected utility maximization reduces to maximization of expected lifetime
income, net of moving costs, with the understanding that the value of amenities is included in income, and
that both amenity values and moving costs are measured in consumption units.
6  This is a natural
benchmark model, although of course it imposes strong assumptions.
78See Banks and Sundaram (1994) for an analysis of the Gittins index in the presence of moving costs.

There is little hope of solving this problem analytically.  In particular, the Gittins index solution of the
multiarmed bandit problem cannot be applied because there is a cost of moving.
8  But by using a discrete
approximation of the wage distribution in each location, we can compute the value function and the
optimal decision rule by standard dynamic programming methods, following Rust (1994). 
Let Fj be the wage distribution function in location j.  We approximate this by a discrete distribution
over n points, as follows.  Let  , where s = 1,2,...,n.  Then Fj is approximated by a
uniform distribution over the set {aj(s)}s
n
=1.  For example, if n = 10, the approximation puts probability
1/10 on the 5
th, 15
th, ... 95
th percentiles of the distribution Fj.
3.1 The Value Function
Consider a person currently in location , with a J-vector  summarizing what is known about wages
in all locations.  Here j is either 0 or an integer between 1 and n, with the interpretation that if j = s > 0,
then the wage in location j is known to be aj(s), and if j = 0 then the wage in location j is still unknown,
so that if the person moves to j, the wage will be aj(s) with probability 1/n, for 1  s  n.  The value
function for a native of location h can be written in recursive form as
We compute Vh by value function iteration.  It is convenient to use Vh(,)  0 as the initial estimate,
so that if T is the number of iterations, the result gives the optimal policy for a (rolling) T-period horizon.
4 Empirical Implementation
An important limitation of the discrete dynamic programming method is that the number of states is
typically large, even if the search problem is relatively simple.  If there are J locations and the wage
distribution has n points of support, the number of states is J(n+1)
J.  For example a model with J=5 and
n=10 has 805,255 states.  Although value functions for such a model can be computed in a few hours,
estimation of the structural parameters requires that the value function be computed many times. 
Estimation becomes infeasible unless the number of structural parameters is small.
Ideally, locations would be defined as local labor markets.  The smallest geographical unit identified
in the NLSY is the county, but we obviously cannot let J be the number of counties, since there are over
3,100 counties in the U.S.  Indeed, even if J is the number of States, the model is numerically infeasible,
but by restricting the information available to each individual an approximate version of the model can be
estimated; this is explained below.
4.1 Outline of the Estimation Method
We first expand the model to allow for unobserved heterogeneity in individual payoffs.  Let
 = (1,2,...,J) be a vector of idiosyncratic utility adjustments that are known to the worker before the
migration decision is made in each period, but not observed by the econometrician. We assume that each
component j is drawn independently according to a distribution function ; also, these draws are
independent across individuals and over time.  The individual’s value function is then given by
where  is the vector of unknown parameters and the expected value function   is defined by
If  is the Type 1 Extreme Value distribution then, using arguments due to McFadden (1973) and Rust
(1987) we can show that the function   satisfies9And it will remain so: for example, if a location is a State, and the wage distribution has 5 support points, then
the number of dynamic programming states is 40,414,063,873,238,203,032,156,980,022,826,814,668,800. 
10Note that it is not enough to keep track of the best wage found so far: the preference shocks may favor a
location that has previously been discarded, and it is necessary to know the wage at that location in order to decide
whether to go back there (even if it is known that there is a higher wage at another location).

where
This gives the probability, Pr[d(j) = 1 | h, ,], that a native of h in location  with information  will move
to location j:
4.2 A Limited History Approximation
When the number of locations is moderately large, the model becomes computationally infeasible.
9 
This is a common problem with discrete dynamic programming models, and various devices have been
proposed to deal with it.  In our context it seems natural to use an approximation that takes advantage of
the timing of migration decisions. We have assumed that information on the value of human capital in
alternative locations is permanent, and so if a location has been visited previously, the wage in that
location is known, no matter how much time has passed.  This means that the number of possible states
increases geometrically with the number of locations.  In practice, however, the number of people seen in
many distinct locations is small.  Thus by restricting the information set to include only wages seen in
recent locations, it is possible to drastically shrink the state space while retaining most of the information
actually seen in the data.  Specifically, we suppose that the number of wage observations cannot exceed
M, with M < J, so that it is not possible to be fully informed about wages at all locations. Then if the wage
distribution in each of J locations has n points of support, the number of states is (Jn)
M, since this is the
number of possible M-period histories describing the locations visited most recently, and the wages found
there. For example, if J is 50 and n is 5 and M is 2, the number of states is 62,500, which is manageable.
This approximation reduces the number of states in the most obvious way: we simply delete most of
them.
10  Someone who has “too much” wage information in the big state space is reassigned to a less-
informed state.  Individuals make the same calculations as before when deciding what to do next, and the
econometrician uses the same procedure to recover the parameters governing the individual’s decisions. 
There is just a shorter list of states, so people with different histories may be in different states in the big
model, but they are considered to be in the same state in the reduced model.  In particular, people who
have the same recent history are in the same state, even if their previous histories were different (and
people who have different wage information now may have the same information following a move). 




M-1) be an M-vector containing the sequence of recent locations (beginning with the current
location), and let  be the corresponding sequence containing recent wage information.  Then the
probability that an individual in state (,) will move to location j can again be written in the form
where vj is now defined as
with
4.3 Population Effects
It has long been recognized that location size matters in migration models (see e.g. Schultz [1982]). 
California and Wyoming cannot reasonably be regarded as just two alternative places, to be treated
symmetrically as origin and destination locations.  To take one example, a person who moves to be close
to a friend or relative is more likely to have friends or relatives in California than in Wyoming.  A
convenient way to model this in our framework is to allow for more than one draw from the distribution	
of preference shocks in each location.  Specifically, we assume that the number of draws per location is
an affine function of the number of people already in that location, and that migration decisions are
controlled by the maximal draw for each location.  This leads to the following modification of the logit
function describing migration probabilities:
where
Here nj denotes the population in location j, and the (nonnegative) parameter 	 can be interpreted as the
number of additional draws per person.
4.4 Moving Costs
The cost of moving is specified as
The notation is as follows.  The first two terms specify the moving cost as an affine function of the
distance D(
0,j) from 
0 to j.  The next term allows for the possibility that it is cheaper to move to a
previous location, relative to moving to a new location ( denotes the indicator function).  The last term is
an alternative specification of the effect of location size, allowing for the possibility that it is cheaper to
move to a large location, as measured by population size nj.  One motivation for this is that a larger
location is more likely to contain friends or relatives who would help reduce the cost of the move.  
4.5 Computation
Since the parameters are embedded in the value function, computation of the gradient and hessian of
the loglikelihood function is not a simple matter (although in principle these derivatives can be computed
in a straightforward way using the same iterative procedure that computes the value function itself).  We11Given reasonable starting values (such as a fixed cost of moving that matches the average migration rate, with
all other parameters set to zero), the maximal likelihood is typically reached within 24 hours, on a Pentium 4
machine.  An example of our (FORTRAN90) computer program can be found at
www.ssc.wisc.edu/~jkennan/research/mbr21.f90.
12Attrition in panel data is an obvious problem for migration studies, and one reason for using NLSY data is that
it minimizes this problem.  Reagan and Olsen (2000, p. 339) report that “Attrition rates in the NLSY79 are relatively
low ...The primary reason for attrition are death and refusal to continue participating in the project, not the inability
to locate respondents at home or abroad.”  Ham, Li and Reagan (2001), use NLSY data to compare wages following
migration with (counterfactual) estimates of what the wage would have been if migration had not occurred, but they
do not analyze the migration decision itself.


maximize the likelihood using an “amoeba” algorithm that implements the downhill simplex method of
Nelder and Mead.  This method does not use derivatives, and it seems appropriate for problems such as
this in which there is no reason to expect that the loglikelihood function is concave.  In practice the
method works well for the models we have estimated so far; in particular, it is robust to large changes in
the starting values of the parameters.  On the other hand, the method is slow, and so we also use gradient
methods to speed up the computations, particularly when doing sensitivity analysis.
11
5 Empirical Results
We analyze the migration decisions of men aged 20-35, using the non-military subsample of the
NLSY79, observed over the period 1979-1992.  In order to obtain a relatively homogeneous sample, we
consider only white high-school graduates with no college education, using only the years after schooling
is completed.
12
5.1 Age Adjustment of Earnings
The model assumes that wages are stationary, and that each individual draws a level of permanent
income in each location that is visited.  In the data, however, wages vary systematically with age, and
there are also substantial transient wage variations.  Figure 1 shows the age-earnings profiles (by quintile)
for white high school graduates in the NLSY79.  These profiles are steep: earnings more than double
between the ages of 20 and 35.  Since migrants are necessarily older following a move than they were
before the move, we must make some adjustment for age, so as not to attribute to migration the earnings
growth due to age.  We assume that wage components are additively separable, that the age-earnings
profile is the same across all locations, and that the transient wage component is drawn from the same
distribution in all locations.  This implies that neither the transitory component nor the earnings profile is
relevant for migration decisions.13See Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and Katz and Autor (1999).

Suppose that the wage of individual i in location j at age a is 
where 
j is a known constant, (a) is a known age-earnings profile, i is an individual effect that is fixed
across locations (and known to the individual), uij is a permanent match effect, and 
 is a transient effect.
We assume that , u and 
 are independent, and that u and 
 are identically distributed across locations. 
In order to implement the model, we first need to estimate the distribution of u.  One problem is that even
if the mean of uij across individuals is zero in all locations, the realizations of u found in measured wages
reflect selection effects due to migration decisions.  Allowing for selection effects would be difficult, and
migration rates are low enough to suggest that the required effort might not be worthwhile.  Another
problem is that we cannot separate u and 
 using Census data, and there are not enough observations in
the NLSY to get reliable estimates of wage distributions for each State.  We deal with this by appealing to
results from previous research indicating that the transient earnings component is responsible for about
one-third of the variance of earnings.
13  
The wage distribution in State j is modeled as a 3-point approximation with support points
, s  {1,2,3}, where 
 ˆj is the estimated State effect, and u ˆ(qs) is the qs quantile of the
estimated distribution of u, with .  This wage distribution refers to earnings at some
standard age, which we take to be 30.  PUMS data from the 1990 Census are used to estimate wage
distributions for each State (because the sample size in the NLSY data is not sufficient for this purpose).
Wages are adjusted for cost of living differences using the ACCRA index.  These State wage distributions
are tabulated in Appendix A.
Consider an individual who is in the same location for m years.  The average wage over this period,
excluding State and age effects, is
This implies
Suppose that one-third of the total variance is due to the transient component, and let  be the proportion
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2 =  (
2 + u
2
 ), so the match
component u can be estimated by the signal-extraction formula
We use this estimate to determine individual i’s position in the 3-point wage distribution for location j.  If
u ˆ falls in the top third of the distribution, then the high wage is assigned; if u ˆ falls in the bottom third then
the low wage is assigned, and otherwise the median wage is assigned.  In other words, for each State in
which we have earnings data on an individual, we approximate that individual’s permanent wage in that
State as one of three wage numbers in the appropriate row of Appendix Table A1.
5.2 Partial Likelihood Estimates
We condition on the estimated earnings distributions for each State and maximize the partial
likelihood to obtain estimates of the behavioral parameters.  We set  =.9, T = 40, and  = ½.  We show
in section 5.8 below that our main results are not very sensitive to these parameter settings. 
Table 2: Interstate Migration of Young White Men
12 Years of Schooling
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Loglikelihood -3209.87 -3193.78 -2471.87

2 (1) 51 32.186




Estimated asymptotic standard errors are given in italics below the coefficients.
The length of the horizon is 40 years, with discount factor  = .9
The wage distributions have 3 points of support.
Distances are measured between State population centroids (in thousands of miles).
Population is measured in units of 10 million people.
Table 2 shows that differences in expected income are a significant determinant of migration
decisions for this population.  There are 9,682 person-years in the data, with 397 interstate moves.  This is
an annual migration rate of 4.1%, and the first column in Table 2 matches this rate by setting the14In other words the estimate of 0 solves the equation  ; the solution is
0 = log(464250) - log(397). 
15The 
2 statistics in the table are for likelihood ratio tests of the form 2log(L
U/L
R) ~ ²(r), where r is the number
of restrictions embodied in L
R relative to L
U.
16The validity of the estimates is checked in Appendix B: the estimated coefficients were used to generate a
simulated data set, and the maximum likelihood procedure successfully recovered these coefficients from the
simulated data.
17This refers to the cost of moving to a new location, ignoring the effect of population and distance.  In the case
of a return move, the estimated moving cost is $131,048.  The estimated cost of moving 1,000 miles to a State with a
population of 3 million is $269,726.

probability of moving to each of J-1 locations to a constant value, namely  , with J = 51.
14  The
next columns show that population size, distance, and home and previous locations all have highly
significant effects on migration.
15  The last column shows the effect of income, controlling for these other
effects, using wages adjusted for cost of living differences across States.
16  These estimates are interpreted
in the following subsections.
5.3 Moving Costs and Preference Shocks
Since utility is linear in income, we can translate the estimated moving cost into a dollar equivalent. 
This gives 0/ =  $258,727 (using the estimates in the last column of Table 2), with the interpretation
that the compensation needed to just offset the cost of a move is very large: other things equal, a lump-
sum of about $250,000 would be needed to fully compensate someone for the costs of a move.
17  Another
way to interpret our result is to note that a $10,000 migration subsidy (modeled as a reduction in 0 such
that 0/ falls by $10,000 with the other parameters held fixed) would increase the interstate migration
rate from 4.1% to 5.75% .
It may seem that th large moving cost is an artifact of the specification of the model.  For example, in
the absence of any moving cost, allowing preference shocks to be drawn randomly over J locations
implies a migration probability of (J-1)/J, so that with J = 51, nearly everybody moves every period.  The
first column of Table 2 shows how large the fixed cost of moving has to be in relation to the preference
shocks, in order to reduce the migration rate from 50/51 to the observed rate of 4.10%, when all other
influences on migration are suppressed.  The last column shows that the estimated moving cost is large in
relation to the income coefficient, even after allowing for the effects of population and distance and the
home premium and previous location.
(24)
(25)
To understand why the estimated moving cost is so big, it is helpful to consider an example in which
income differentials and moving costs are the only influences on migration decisions.  Suppose that
income in each location is either high or low, and let y be the difference between the high and low
income levels.  Suppose also that the realization of income in each location is known.  Then the odds of
moving are given by
where L is the probability of staying in a low-income location and JL is the number of such locations, and
similarly for H and JH, and where V is the difference in expected continuation values between the low-
income and high-income locations, which is determined by the equation
For example, if  = 0, then V = y, and if moving costs are prohibitive (exp(-0)  0), then
V = y/(1-).
These equations identify  and 0 (these parameters are in fact over-identified, because there is also
information in the probabilities of moving to the same income level).  If 0 < V, then the odds of
moving from a low-income location are greater than JH to 1, and this is contrary to what is seen in the data
(for any plausible value of JH).  By making 0 a little bigger than V, and letting both of these be large
in relation to the preference shocks, the probability of moving from the low-income location can be made
small.  But then the probability of moving from the high-income location is almost zero, which is not true
in the data.  In other words, if the probability of moving from a high-income location is not negligible,
then the preference shocks cannot be negligible, since a preference shock is the only reason for making
such a move.
By making both 0 and V large, the ratio can be made arbitrarily close to 1 while preserving a
fixed difference.  But making them large kills the effect of the preference shocks.  There must be a18Since we have unbalanced panel data, the binomial probabilities are weighted by the distribution of years per
person.

positive difference to explain why there is a strong tendency to stay in low-income locations.  The upshot
is that the moving cost has to be a relatively large multiple of the difference in continuation values.  For
example, if y = $5,000, then V/ could be as large as $45,000, and the moving cost must be higher
than this.  But this doesn’t explain why the estimate is over $250,000.
There are of course potentially important influences on migration decisions that are not included in
our model, and one interpretation of the results is that, on average, the omitted variables strongly favor
staying in the current location.  If this is so, a more complete model might yield a more plausible estimate
of the moving cost.  For example, there may be some components of wages that are known to the
individual, but not included in the model.  If the wage distribution is mis-specified in this way, some of
the apparent gains available to a person with a low wage realization in the current location are illusory,
and this biases the estimate of  toward zero.
5.4 Goodness of Fit
In order to keep the state space manageable, our model severely restricts the set of variables that are
allowed to affect migration decisions.  Examples of omitted observable variables include age, duration in
the current location, and the number of moves made previously.  In addition, there are of course
unobserved characteristics that might make some people more likely to move than others.  Thus it is
important to check how well the model fits the data.  In particular, since the model pays very little
attention to individual histories, one might expect that it would have trouble fitting panel data.
One simple test of goodness of fit can be made by comparing the number of moves per person in the
data with the number predicted by the model.  As a benchmark, we consider a binomial distribution with a
migration probability of 4.1% (which is the number of moves per person-year in the data).  Table 3 shows
the predictions from this model: about 72% of the people never move, and of those who do move, about
16% move more than once.
18  The NLSY data are quite different: more than 80% never move, and about
44% of movers move more than once.  A natural interpretation of this is mover-stayer heterogeneity:
some people are more likely to move than others, and these people account for more than their share of
the observed moves.  We simulated the corresponding statistics for the model by starting 100 replicas of
the NLSY individuals in the observed initial locations, and using the model (with the estimated
parameters shown in Table 2) to generate a history for each replica, covering the number of periods
observed for this individual.  The results match the data very well: although the proportion of people who19We have not estimated models with unobserved heterogeneity, because even the simplest specification doubles
the size of the state space and introduces a difficult initial conditions problem, and because there is no particular
reason to believe that our main results are sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity.  As a rough check, we simulated
migration histories for a heterogeneous population and estimated our (mis-specified) model on these data. 
Heterogeneity was introduced by mixing two sub-samples with different moving costs.  We tried several
experiments along these lines, with similar results: neglecting unobserved heterogeneity in moving costs introduces a
negligible bias in the estimated coefficients.  Most importantly, we find that the estimated effect of income is, if
anything, slightly underestimated, indicating that models with unobserved heterogeneity are likely to strengthen our
conclusion that migration decisions are sensitive to differences in income prospects.

never move is slightly below the observed proportion, the proportion of movers who move more than
once matches the data very closely.  In this respect, the observables in the model do a good job of
accounting for the heterogeneous migration probabilities in the data.
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Table 3: Goodness of Fit
Moves Binomial NLSY Model
None 887.20 72.48% 986 80.56% 96229 78.62%
One 282.99 23.12% 133 10.87% 14685 12.00%
More 53.81 4.40% 105 8.58% 11486 9.38%
Proportion of movers with
more than one move
15.98% 44.12% 43.89%
Total observations 1224 1224 122400
Return Migration
Table 4 summarizes the extent to which the model can reproduce the return migration patterns seen in
the data (the statistics in the Model column refer to the simulated data set used in Table 3).
Table 4: Return Migration Statistics
NLSY Model 
Proportion of Movers who
Return home 34.3% 31.3%
Return elsewhere 6.5% 5.0%
Move on 59.2% 63.6%
Proportion who ever
Leave Home 15.5% 14.5%
Move from not-home 45.1% 59.3%
Return from not-home 33.3% 27.3%
The model attaches a premium to the home location, and this helps explain why people return home. 
For example, in a model with no home premium, one would expect that the migration flow to any
particular location would be roughly 
/(J-1), where 
 is the average migration rate.  Given 
 = .0410 and
J = 51, this obviously does not match the observed return rate of 34%.  The home premium also reduces
the chance of initially leaving home, although this effect is offset by the substantial discount on the cost
of returning to a previous location (including the home location): leaving home is less costly if a return
move is relatively cheap.
The return migration in the simulated data matches the actual data reasonably well.  The main
discrepancy is that the model substantially over-predicts the proportion who ever move from an initial
location that is not their home location.  That is, the model has difficulty explaining why people seem so
attached to an initial location that is not their “home”.  One potential explanation for this is that our
assignment of home locations (the State of residence at age 14) is too crude.  In some cases the location at
age 20 may be more like a home location than the location at age 14.  More generally, people are
presumably more likely to put down roots the longer they stay in a location, and our model cannot capture
this kind of duration dependence.
5.5 Why are Younger People More Likely to Move?
It is well known that the propensity to migrate falls with age (at least after age 25 or so).  Table 5
replicates this finding for our sample of high-school men. A standard human capital explanation for this
age effect is that migration is an investment: if a higher income stream is available elsewhere, then the
sooner a move is made, the sooner the income increase is realized.  Moreover, since the worklife is finite,
a move that is worthwhile for a younger worker might not be worthwhile for an older worker, because	
there is less time for the higher income stream to offset the moving cost (Sjaastad [1962]).  In other
words, migrants are more likely to be young for the same reason that students are more likely to be
young.
Table 5
Annual Interstate Migration Rates by Age and Current Location
All Not At Home
a At Home
Age N Migration Rate N Migration Rate N Migration Rate
20 817 0.050 101 0.228 716 0.025
21 907 0.052 102 0.206 805 0.032
22 931 0.048 116 0.207 815 0.026
23 915 0.043 131 0.153 784 0.024
24 942 0.051 146 0.171 796 0.029
25 895 0.053 142 0.141 753 0.036
26 888 0.045 154 0.175 734 0.018
27 862 0.034 136 0.125 726 0.017
28 706 0.035 123 0.114 583 0.019
29 595 0.018 109 0.064 486 0.008
30 483 0.021  84 0.083 399 0.008
31 340 0.026  51 0.118 289 0.010
32 228 0.018  37 0.027 191 0.016
33 130 0.015  12 0.000 118 0.017
34 43 .000   5 0.000  38 0.000
All 9,682 0.041 1,449 0.146 8,233 0.022
aAt Home means living now in the State of residence at age 14.
This explanation for age effects has two parts, and our model deals with the first part, but not the
second.  We assume an infinite horizon, so that the decision problem is stationary.  This assumption is
made for tractability: in a finite-horizon model, age is a state variable, and so the size of the state space20Marriage is another important factor, but in order to deal with this we would have to double or triple the size of
the state space (depending on whether we distinguished between divorced and single people).
21One way to see this is to consider the extreme case in which there are no preference shocks.  In this case all
workers born in the low-wage location will move to the high-wage location at the first opportunity (assuming that
the wage difference is big enough to offset the moving cost), and the migration rate will be zero from then on.
22To analyze this, the model must be extended to include age as a state variable.  Although this is beyond the
scope of the current paper, the extension might not be as difficult as it seems.  We compute the infinite horizon
model by iterating on the value function, starting from zero, and continuing through T iterations.  This algorithm is
known to converge to the infinite-horizon value function, so if T is large, additional iterations leave the value




20  Given workers of different ages who otherwise have the same migration and
wage histories, the infinite-horizon model makes the same prediction: the age difference is irrelevant,
according to the model.  Nevertheless, the model can potentially explain why younger workers are more
likely to move.  For example, consider two locations paying different wages, and suppose that workers
are randomly assigned across these locations at birth.  Then the model predicts that the probability of
moving from the low-wage to the high-wage location is higher than the probability of a move in the other
direction, so that eventually there will be more workers in the high-wage location, and the migration rate
will be unrelated to age.  This implies that the migration rate must be higher when workers are young.
21
The second part of the human capital explanation says that migration rates decline with age because
the horizon gets closer as workers get older.  This is surely an important reason for the difference in
migration propensities between young adult workers and those within sight of retirement.  But the
workers in our sample are all in their twenties or early thirties, and the prospect of retirement seems
unimportant for such workers.  Indeed, that is why the infinite-horizon assumption seems like a
reasonable approximation for the population that we are studying.  This suggests that the first part of the
human capital explanation must be the dominant force explaining why migration rates for 30-year-olds
are substantially lower than for 25-year-olds.  In other words, if the human capital explanation is correct,
our infinite-horizon model should be able to capture the relationship between migration rates and age.
One way to examine this question is to ask whether our model fits equally well for younger and older
workers.  Table 6 shows that it does not: although there are no dramatic differences in the parameter
estimates for younger and older workers, a likelihood ratio test decisively rejects the hypothesis that the
parameters are equal.  In principle, this difference might be explained by the difference in horizon, but the
last column of the table shows that reducing the horizon of the older subsample by 10 years has a
negligible effect on the results.  This suggests that the human capital model does not give an adequate
explanation of the relationship between age and migration rates.
22algorithm computes the value function for someone who has 40 years left before retirement, but as a by-product it
also computes the value functions for someone with t years to retirement, for any t (the first iteration gives the value
function with one year left, and the t
th iteration gives the value function with t years left).

Table 6: Age Differences in Migration Rates
White Men, High School Education
All Ages 20-25 26-34 26-34 (T=30)
Disutility of
Moving
6.4083 6.3112 6.5155 6.5164
0.1111 0.1376 0.2031 0.2029
Distance
(1000 miles)
0.5210 0.4247 0.7435 0.7434
0.0760 0.0930 0.1375 0.1379
Home Premium 0.3554 0.2702 0.3310 0.3333
0.0175 0.0300 0.0269 0.0269
Previous location
(moving cost)
3.1624 3.3394 3.1564 3.1601
0.1492 0.1916 0.2645 0.2647
Population 0.8284 0.8328 0.7322 0.7320
0.0871 0.1063 0.1610 0.1607
Real Income 
(ACCRA)
0.2477 0.3230 0.2723 0.2736
0.0572 0.0771 0.0966 0.0972
Loglikelihood
-2471.870 -1625.881 -821.327 -821.342
$258,713 -2447.209

2(6) p-value 49.32 0.00000
Moving cost $258,713 $195,393 $239,244 $238,172
N (person-years) 9,682 5,407 4,275 4,275
Moves 397 267 130 130
Migration rate 0.0410 0.0494 0.0304 0.0304
5.6 Decomposing the Effects of Income on Migration Decisions
In our model, differences in wage distributions across States are due entirely to differences in State
means.  This raises the question of whether the estimated coefficients would be similar if wage dispersion
is ignored, and migration decisions are modeled as responses to differences in mean wages across
locations.  The results of this exercise are shown in Table 7, 9, 9.  Surprisingly, the estimate of the income
coefficient () is insignificant in this specification.  Going to the other extreme, we specified the wage
distribution at the national level, with no variation across States.  This restores the positive estimate of . 
Evidently, our results are not driven by differences in mean wages across States.  We turn next to an
analysis of how the data manage to generate a significant income coefficient, even when the variation in
incomes across States is suppressed.
Table 7: Alternative Income Specifications
Census State Means National
























The “State Means” column assumes that there is no wage
dispersion within States.  The “national” column assumes that
wage distributions are identical in all States.
5.7 Movers and Stayers
A useful decomposition of the likelihood can be obtained by separating the decision on whether to
move from the decision on where to go, conditional on moving.  The likelihood that location j is chosen
when the current location is  can be written as23Note that the move-stay model accounts for the full set of alternative destination choices: there is no need to
choose a “representative” alternative, as in Gelbach (2002), for example.  The continuation value for each alternative
location is evaluated using location-specific data, and a move occurs if the continuation in some alternative location
beats the value of the incumbent location (given the current realization of the vector of preference shocks).

Then p is the probability of staying, and 1-p is the probability of moving.  The probability of choosing
location j can be factored as
where p j is the probability of choosing j, conditional on moving:
The parameters governing migration decisions can be estimated using only the move/stay
probabilities, and they can also be estimated using only the conditional destination choice probabilities.
This helps pin down the source of the results.  Each observation adds log(pj) to the full loglikelihood,
where j is the chosen location.  In the case of a move, the loglikelihood in the mover-stayer model is
counted as log(1-p ), while the destination choice model counts the loglikelihood of each observation as
log(pj ) - log(1-p ).  Thus, for given parameter values, the sum of the loglikelihoods for the mover-stayer
model and the destination choice model must be the same as the loglikelihood of the full model.
23
The results of this decomposition are shown in Table 8.  Since the destination choice data contain
very little information on the fixed cost of moving, this parameter was held fixed in the destination choice
model.  Table 8 shows that the positive income coefficient appears in the decision to move, but not in the
choice of destination. The move/stay model shows that the probability of moving is higher when the
income realization in the current location is bad.  The result for the destination choice model indicates that
high-wage States are not more likely to be chosen.
Table 8: Movers and Stayers
White Men, High School Education























-2471.870 -1429.159 -995.805 
$258,713 -2424.965

2(6) p-value 93.81 0.00000
N (person-years) 9,682
Moves 397
Another result is that the model fails the specification test associated with the decomposition of the
likelihood into move-stay and conditional destination choice components: the parameter estimates differ
significantly across these two components.  In particular, the home premium seems to have a bigger effect
on destination choices than on decisions about whether to stay in the home location.24The maximum likelihood is estimate of  is around .84, but  = .9 is easily accepted by a likelihood ratio test.
25In principle,  can be estimated using the NLSY data, because the autocovariance of wages includes u
2 for
stayers, but not for movers.  The best estimate of  obtained from the wage covariogram is about .75, but this
estimate is fragile, and a smaller value of  gives a higher value of the likelihood in the migration model.  Although
joint estimation of  and the other parameters is feasible, we have not pursued this because the results in Table 9
suggest that it would not be very informative.

5.8 Sensitivity Analysis
Our empirical results are inevitably based on some more or less arbitrary model specification choices. 
Table 9 explores the robustness of the results with respect to some of these choices.  The general
conclusion is that the parameter estimates are robust.  In particular, the income coefficient estimate
remains positive and significant in all of our alternative specifications.
The results presented so far are based on wages that are adjusted for cost of living differences across
locations.  If these cost of living differences merely capitalize the value of amenity differences, then
unadjusted wages should be used to measure the incentive to migrate.  Results for this specification are
given in the fourth column of Table 9: the estimate of  is reduced by about 20%, with little effect on the
other coefficients, and the likelihood is lower.  Thus in practice the theoretical ambiguity as to whether
wages should be adjusted for cost of living differences does not have much effect on the empirical results:
either way, income shows up as a significant determinant of migration decisions.
Table 9 also shows that the results are not sensitive to variations in how distance and location size
affect migration.  As was discussed in Section 4, size (as measured by population) may affect migration
either as a scaling factor on the preference shocks, or as a variable affecting the cost of migration.  The
results in the last column of Table 9 show that allowing population to enter as a scaling factor on the
preference shocks adds virtually nothing to the basic specification.  We also expanded the moving cost
specification to allow quadratic effects of distance and location size; this has little effect on the results.
The other alternative specifications in Table 9 are concerned with sensitivity of the estimates to the
discount factor (), the horizon length (T) and the proportion of the residual permanent wage variance
attributed to individual effects that are fixed across locations ().  Increasing  to .95 has a noticeable
effect on the utility flow parameters (i.e. the home premium and the income coefficient), with hardly any
effect on the moving cost parameters.  Although a 5% annual real interest rate is arguably more plausible
than the 10% rate assumed in our baseline specification, the likelihood when  is set at .95 is substantially
lower.
24  Reducing T from 40 to 20 has very little effect (as might be expected with  =.9).  Large changes
in  lead to modest changes in : increasing the relative importance of location match effects (i.e.
decreasing ) yields some improvement in the likelihood, and a somewhat lower estimate of .
25
Table 9: Alternative Specifications
Base  =.95  =.85 No Cola Quadratic   =.25  =.75 T=20 AltPop
Disutility of Moving 6.4083 6.4185 6.4128 6.3957 6.4427 6.4124 6.4009 6.4158 6.3663
0.1111 0.1093 0.1073 0.1104 0.1566 0.1112 0.1107 0.1111 0.1197
Distance
(1000 miles)
0.5210 0.4796 0.4474 0.5211 0.5897 0.5230 0.5210 0.5213 0.5112
0.0760 0.0696 0.0654 0.0766 0.2079 0.0758 0.0765 0.0766 0.0763 
Squared Distance ------ ------ ------ ------ -0.0373 ------ ------ ------ ------
0.0920
Home Premium 0.3554 0.2482 0.1962 0.3513 0.3543 0.3581 0.3510 0.3668 0.3553
0.0175 0.0127 0.0104 0.0172 0.0177 0.0177 0.0173 0.0179 0.0181
Previous Location
(moving cost)
3.1624  3.0699 2.9518 3.0843 3.1521 3.1815 3.1095 3.1797 3.1743
0.1492 0.1451 0.1396 0.1466 0.1507 0.1498 0.1474 0.1499 0.1495
Population
(moving cost)
0.8284 0.7678 0.7300 0.8431 1.0042 0.8313 0.8337 0.8342 0.7678
0.0871 0.0827 0.0794 0.0876 0.2582 0.0869 0.0874 0.0869 0.1012




------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 0.0193
0.0172
Income 0.2477 0.1672 0.3293 0.1988 0.2444 0.1963 0.2690 0.2568 0.2408
0.0572 0.0383 0.0770 0.0703 0.0572 0.0422 0.0785 0.0595 0.0582
Loglikelihood -2471.87 -2476.90 -2471.34 -2477.73 -2471.48 -2470.42 -2475.74 -2472.13 -2471.23 
Notes: The base specification assumes  = .9, T = 40 and  = .5.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have developed a tractable econometric model of optimal migration in response to income
differentials across locations.  The model improves on previous work in two respects: it covers optimal
sequences of location decisions (rather than a single once-for-all choice), and it allows for many
alternative location choices.  Migration decisions are made so as to maximize the expected present value
of lifetime income, but these decisions are modified by the influence of unobserved location-specific
preference shocks.  Because the number of locations is too large to allow the complete dynamic
programming problem to be modeled, we adopt an approximation that truncates the amount of
information available to the decision-maker.  The practical effect of this is that the decisions of a
relatively small set of people who have made an unusually large number of moves are modeled less
accurately than they would be in the (computationally infeasible) complete model.
Our empirical results show a significant effect of expected income differences on interstate migration,
for white male high school graduates in the NLSY.  On the other hand we find little evidence of migration
in response to wage differentials across States.  Instead, our results can be interpreted in terms of optimal
search for the best geographic match.  In particular, we find that the relationship between income and
migration is driven primarily by a negative effect of income in the current location on the probability of
out-migration: workers who get a good draw in their current location tend to stay, while those who get a
bad draw tend to leave.
Our estimates indicate that moving costs are very large.  For example, if we ignore differences due to
distance and location size and the home location effect, we estimate that about a quarter of a million
dollars would be needed to fully compensate for the costs of an interstate move.  But if moving costs were
fully compensated, nearly everyone would move all the time.  Perhaps a more informative statement is
that we estimate that a $10,000 migration subsidy would increase the interstate migration rate by about
40%.
The main limitations of our model are those imposed by the discrete dynamic programming structure:
given the large number of alternative location choices, the number of dynamic programming states must
be severely restricted for computational reasons.  Goodness of fit tests indicate that the model
nevertheless fits the data reasonably well.  The main discrepancy between the model and the data arises
from a stationarity assumption that precludes the use of age as a state variable.  The development of a
model that relaxes this assumption is a promising area for further research.	
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Appendix A: Wage Distributions 
Table A1 shows the three-point approximation to the state earnings distributions derived from the
PUMS data.  Earnings are expressed in 1983 dollars, adjusted for cost of living differences using the
ACCRA index (http://www.coli.org/).  We used unweighted city averages within States from one quarter
in 1979, 1981, 1987, and 1990 to calculate the index.  The second column reports the number of
observations in the PUMS for each State. Earnings values for the low, medium and high cells appear in
the 16%, 50% and 83% columns.  The  and  quantile values define the cell boundaries. Table A1: State Earnings Distributions
White Male High School Graduates
Percentiles of Earnings Distribution
State Nobs 16% 33% Median 67% 83%
Alabama 5127 15548 16712 17674 18733 20166
Alaska 1016 14784 15948 16910 17969 19402
Arizona 3986 13747 14910 15872 16932 18365
Arkansas 3969 13771 14935 15897 16957 18389
California 27983 15635 16799 17761 18821 20254
Colorado 4828 14421 15585 16547 17606 19039
Connecticut 4881 15932 17096 18058 19117 20550
Delaware 1083 15820 16984 17946 19005 20438
DC 90 12011 13174 14136 15196 16629
Florida 17080 14446 15609 16571 17631 19064
Georgia 9109 16143 17307 18269 19328 20761
Hawaii 1063 11666 12830 13792 14851 16284
Idaho 1544 14427 15591 16553 17612 19045
Illinois 16658 16060 17224 18186 19245 20678
Indiana 11491 15998 17162 18124 19183 20616
Iowa 5108 14275 15438 16400 17460 18893
Kansas 4142 14775 15939 16901 17960 19393
Kentucky 6987 14433 15597 16558 17618 19051
Louisiana 5411 15260 16424 17386 18446 19878
Maine 2869 15249 16412 17374 18434 19867
Maryland 6671 17539 18703 19665 20724 22157
Massachusetts 9882 15824 16988 17950 19009 20442
Michigan 15702 14834 15998 16960 18020 19453
Minnesota 8103 14627 15790 16752 17812 19245
Mississippi 2589 14585 15749 16711 17770 19203
Missouri 9285 14918 16081 17043 18103 19536
Montana 1188 13190 14354 15316 16376 17809
Nebraska 2572 13766 14929 15891 16951 18384
Nevada 2157 15756 16920 17882 18941 20374
New Hampshire 2292 13749 14913 15875 16934 18367
New Jersey 11183 16588 17751 18713 19773 21206
New Mexico 1949 12508 13672 14634 15694 17127
New York 23896 15329 16492 17454 18514 19947
North Carolina 10021 14817 15981 16943 18002 19435
North Dakota 930 12766 13930 14892 15951 17384
Ohio 20932 15363 16526 17488 18548 19981
Oklahoma 4617 13623 14786 15748 16808 18241
Oregon 4117 14246 15410 16372 17431 18864
Pennsylvania 25366 14851 16015 16977 18036 19469
Rhode Island 1602 15336 16499 17461 18521 19954
South Carolina 4230 15585 16749 17711 18770 20203
South Dakota 1077 12699 13862 14824 15884 17317
Tennessee 8052 14802 15966 16928 17987 19420
Texas 20624 14588 15751 16713 17773 19206
Utah 2208 15825 16989 17951 19010 20443
Vermont 1254 13766 14930 15892 16951 18384
Virginia 9097 16124 17287 18249 19309 20742
Washington 7417 16018 17182 18144 19203 20636
West Virginia 3524 13279 14443 15405 16464 17897
Wisconsin 10503 16109 17273 18235 19294 20727
Wyoming 806 15947 17111 18073 19132 20565Appendix B: Validation of ML Estimates
Table B: ML Estimates Using Simulated Data
NLSY Simulated






Home Premium 0.3554 0.3560
0.0175 0.0021






“Real” Income ($10,000) 0.2477 0.2497
0.0572 0.0056
Loglikelihood -2471.870 -247440.93




The ML parameter estimates from Table 2 were used to generate
100 replicas of each NLSY observation, starting from the actual
value in the NLSY data, and allowing the model to choose the
sequence of locations.  Two alternative starting points were used
when estimating the parameters from the simulated data: the actual
parameter values used to generate the data, and the one-parameter
estimate from the first column of Table 2 (with all other parameters
set to zero).  For both starting points the estimates converged to the
values shown in the last column above (this required 2 Newton steps
starting from the truth, and 9 Newton steps starting from the one-
parameter estimate).